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The aim of this paper is to examine about managing conflict in the BN (Barisan 
Nasional). The core of the study focuses on the conflict ethnic during the seat 
allocation process in elections and the allocation of cabinet posts at federal 
government level. To elaborate on these two focal points, five main objectives aimed 
at uncovering the contributing factors to the BN’s stability and solidarity to continue 
ruling a multiethnic society. A total of 28 political figures in the BN and two from 
opponent parties were identified as interviewees. Results of this study revealed that 
the BN employed its own, unique approach in handling conflicts. Firstly, Power-
sharing shows that the BN applies a formula for seat allocation using three stringent 
processes to ensure that each of its components receives a fair allocation of seats 
commensurate with the performance and strength of the party. For the allocation of 
cabinet and Exco posts, each party is provided with the opportunity and position to 
hold the post, so that each component party would have an avenue of participation in 
the development of policies and direction of the national administration. Secondly, the 
principles practised within the BN, which includes decision-making procedures, the 
representativeness and confidentiality of discussions on seat allocation and Cabinet 
post allocation, are confined only to the main elite groups of the component parties. 
The involvement and knowledge of other party members, especially those at branch 
and divisional levels, are extremely limited and restricted in these areas. Thirdly,  in 
the process of allocating seats and Cabinet posts, some bargaining inevitably takes 
place, usually by two parties, namely a component party of the BN and an NGO. 
There are four factors contributing to this bargaining. The scope of this bargaining 
also involves four areas. Fourthly,  the management of conflict in seat and Cabinet 
post allocations demonstrates that the BN continuously faces various challenges from 
time to time. Seven different challenges are outlined, and these often pose as elements 
that threaten the strength and stability of the BN. The control of these elements is 
important in ensuring that the BN continues to be sound and stable, whilst failure 
would put the BN in a quagmire of difficulties in continuing to defend its power.  
Finally to manage the conflict on seat and Cabinet post allocations, the BN also 
practises five approaches in managing these conflicts. The study findings provide a 
comprehensive documentation of the techniques applied by the BN in managing 
conflicts, and it is hoped that it would describe to the public how each party played its 
role in maintaining political stability whilst serving as guidelines to countries facing 
interethnic conflict. 
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Introduction 
 
Malaysia has a unique image in the modern world of politics for taking the 
approach of the consociational model in managing the existing multiracial society 
consisting of the three major races, namely the Malays, Chinese and Indians. This is 
obvious, as stated by Lijpahrt in his book entitled, ‘Democracy in Plural Societies’ 
(1977), which included Malaysia as one of the examples for the consociational 
democracy model. Although this study does not comprehensively look at the 
implementation of the consociational democracy model, its core essence touches on 
the primary characteristic of the model, the grand coalition and proportionality which 
involves the main characters, namely the elite groups, in managing conflict. 
The BN, formed by a coalition of 14 political parties in 1974, is a party that 
constantly requires a mandate from the people to govern the country. In implementing 
the democratic system, one of the best ways to get such a mandate is through a 
general election. The election system stipulates that the party with a majority of seats 
is automatically given the ‘authority’ to form the government.  
As a coalition, the BN allocates the seats it will contest for to its component 
parties at every election. The process of allocation is an arduous task, particularly in 
trying to satisfy all factions concerned. Each party in the coalition would want more 
seats than what is allocated to it. Sometimes, such desires could be resolved amicably. 
But most of the time, conflict must be faced especially when a party refuses to back 
down and instead insists on pursuing its desire for extra seats. 
Pursuant to the study objectives, the conflicts faced by the BN illustrate and 
show in detail how the process of determining or distributing electoral constituencies 
is done among the component parties of the BN. There are three primary stages, in 
which screening is carried out to determine if a constituency is eligible to be allocated 
to a particular component of the BN. Typically taking two years before an election, 
this process ensures that every party is satisfied and there would not be much protest 
when the actual allocation is implemented. Among the processes involved are the 
review of the distribution of electorates by constituency, the analysis of party 
performance in the election and the quota system. 
Further to these, chapter four related the conflicts that occurred as a 
consequence of seat allocation among the component parties of the BN. These 
significant conflicts, described according to year of election, generally reveal two 
trends or situations in which conflict often occurs. The first is inter-ethnic conflict 
between the Malays (UMNO), Chinese (the MCA, Gerakan) and Indians (the MIC). 
The second is intra-ethnic conflict, with reference to the MCA and Gerakan, which 
are the two parties frequently squabbling for additional seats. In addition, conflict on 
seat allocation is also investigated in Penang and Kedah. 
After voters have cast their votes, the party winning the majority number of 
seats is given the chance to form the government. An important element in this 
process is determining the Cabinet line-up for the central government and the Exco 
line-up at state government level. Generally, Cabinet/Exco posts in a coalition need to 
be distributed among its components. This process is equally filled with conflict, 
either in determining the number of Cabinet members or even the portfolios to be 
given to each component party. 
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Thus, conflicts regarding the allocation of ministerial/Exco posts were 
discussed in chapter five. At the federal level, there are two sources of major 
conflicts; firstly, the allocation or number of minister and deputy minister posts 
acquired by each party; and secondly, the nature of the post obtained or held by each 
party. At Exco level in Penang and Kedah, the situations are pretty much the same. To 
assist in managing this conflict (of seat allocation and Cabinet/Exco appointments), 
negotiation is generally chosen as the best alternative. During negotiation, bargaining 
is an important pawn in settling conflicts faced by the component parties.  
Apart from wrestling with the conflicts it faces, the BN also encounters 
various other demands from its component parties and other interested factions who 
take advantage of the general election euphoria to get what they want . This kind of 
bargaining is naturally inevitable because it is a driving force to garner greater support 
from supporters. As a result, bargaining takes place due to the competition among the 
component parties, pressure from the NGOs, and competition from the opposition 
parties. In other words, the bargain is proposed as an agreement that should the 
request be fulfilled, then victory would be in the BN’s favour, and vice versa.  Among 
the bargains put forth are matters of education, demand for posts, re-delineation of 
electoral constituencies, abolishment of the quota system and bargaining from the 
Suqiu. 
In spite of having to deal with the various and unrelenting conflicts from one 
election to another, the BN never waved the white flag. In other words, they never 
ignored the conflict without any solution. As a party that had succeeded in moulding a 
solid consensual foundation among the component parties, the BN remains intact in 
fending the conflicts that come its way with a variety of approaches. There are two 
formal processes of conflict management in the BN, which are through discussion and 
debate in the BN Supreme Council and Government Administrative Meeting. Both of 
these main channels can be used as platforms on which all conflicts are resolved using 
the best procedures for mutual benefit, creating a win-win situation among the 
component parties of the BN. 
In managing conflicts using the best way possible, the BN adopted at least 
four steps of resolution. The first step is to analyse the conflict, the second is to 
determine its management strategy, the third is to negotiate and the final step is to 
post-negotiate. It is this procedure of analysis that led the BN to resolve conflicts 
through the five approaches of Compromise, Collaboration, Competition, Avoidance 
and Accommodation. 
By applying this method of conflict management, the BN had succeeded in 
resolving the conflicts it faced, especially with regards to the allocation of seats and 
posts. The result of this precise method is evident in its resounding success at every 
election. Not only did the BN succeed in forming a government, but in every election, 
it has managed to retain control of Parliament with a two-thirds majority. Such an 
ability is definitely unmatched by the opposition parties. Even so, to forge ahead with 
its established objective, the BN would naturally always face trials and tribulations in 
managing the never-ending conflicts as discussed in chapter eight. If these situations 
can be completely resolved, it is not surprising then that the BN is able to continue 









































This is why the process of seat allocation in the BN is the core theme of this 
study. The allocation of Cabinet or Exco posts is seen as a symbol of acquired power. 
With such a power in hand, it can be modified or moulded into the desired form in an 
attempt to retain that power. As mentioned in the introduction, the general research 
question addressed in this study is how the BN managed conflicts, especially on seat 
and Cabinet/Exco post allocations.  
 
 
The methods and procedures applied by the BN in resolving problems of seat 
allocation and Exco post allocation.  
 
The BN clearly has a systematic approach and structure in managing the 
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procedures have significantly provided an incentive to help safeguard the stability and 
solidarity of the BN. In examining the methods and procedures applied in seat 
allocation, it is clear that the method being practised has brought the BN repeated 
victories in elections to subsequently form a government. 
The performance-driven method of seat allocation spurred the component 
parties to continuously strive towards a better achievement in the next election. An 
excellent or dismal performance would surely influence the allocation of seats to that 
party in the next election. Indirectly, this caused; 
 
i. Every component party to be cautious about its request for the allocation 
of seats because if the allocation requested exceeds its capability, the 
consequences would certainly look bad for that party in the next round. 
Thus the component parties would usually make requests based on past 
performance and its expectation of winning in a particular constituency; 
ii. Every component party to also make every effort to maintain the seat in 
the constituencies allocated to it to prevent any problems that could 
cause its defeat in those constituencies. Should this happen, the party’s 
performance would indeed be jeopardised. 
 
The procedure of seat allocation according to racial composition thus creates a 
situation in which a constituency with a majority population of a particular race 
would be represented by that race. This, in turn; 
 
i. Reduces the conflict in the tussle for constituencies among the 
component parties of the BN. 
 
ii. Ensures that each party understands that this formula limits its options in 
the demand and allocation of seats to constituencies with a majority of a 
particular race only. For instance, the parliamentary seats of Bukit 
Bendera, Bagan, and Tanjong1 in Penang all have majorities of Chinese 
residents, so it is not possible for UMNO to demand that it represents 
these constituencies. 
 
iii. Ensures that the component parties understand that only constituencies 
with mixed racial majorities are eligible for demand. 
 
This situation actually helped mitigate conflicts on seat allocation, narrowing 
it to certain cases only, thus easing the management of conflicts. The seat allocation 
procedure based on quota is an approach that guarantees that parties with minority 
racial compositions would have a representative in the government. In reality, it is 
difficult for the MIC to obtain an allocation based on the racial composition method 
because there is no area in which the majority is Indian. Thus, through this quota 
system, the MIC receives an allocation to ensure that there is a representative from 
the Indian community in the government. This serves to attract Indian voters to 
continue voting for the BN as their party of choice. 
                                               
1 The Chinese majorities in these areas: Bukit Bendera 73.7%, Bagan 64.4% and Tanjong 87.0%. 
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The three procedures and approaches utilised by the BN obviously display 
high rationality in establishing a formula for the allocation of seats among the 
component parties of the BN. The concept of sharing and consensus gives the BN 
strength and support from the various communities in Peninsular Malaysia in 
particular, and the entire Malaysia, in general. The cooperation of each political party 
in this allocation concept means that no party is sidelined or ignored. Instead, every 
party is appreciated and respected. Therefore it is no surprise that although there was 
conflict in the allocation of seats initially, every component party eventually 




Bargaining in the BN  
 
Earlier studies on the Alliance Party by researchers Mayerchak (1975) and 
Esman (1972) revealed that the element of Bargaining already existed as an approach 
for compromise among the component parties to acquire something. Further, Mauzy 
in his study on the BN, ‘Coalition Government in Malaysia’ (1983) also explained the 
existence of this process of bargaining as a procedure to fulfil a specific request 
submitted by a component party. 
 The findings of this study strengthens those of earlier studies explored by 
earlier researchers, where in the process of resolving conflicts regarding the allocation 
of seats and posts, there was the element of bargaining by the component parties, that 
submitted a variety of requests in return for their support for the BN in elections. As 
explained in chapter six, the bargaining comes from various sources. The first is the 
component parties of the BN itself. Here, the bargain is usually an alternative to 
unfulfilled demands for seat or post allocations. This is clear in the case of Penang, 
where UMNO’s demand for the post of Chief Minister was rejected. As a substitute, 
UMNO demanded for the post of Deputy Chief Minister, which was later granted 
after the 1995 election. Demands from component parties were also made to attract 
voters to support the BN in elections. The second source is NGOs with close 
relationships with political parties. The connotation frequently used on these NGOs is 
opportunist, using the election to fulfil their desires. They bargain for something as a 
condition for giving support to the BN. This was obvious in what the Dong Jiao 
Zhong Society did, almost always submitting various demands during every election 
as a reward for supporting the BN candidates, especially in Penang. 
In managing conflicts regarding the allocation of seats and posts, a quick 
decision made within a short period of time is usually required, due to time 
constraints nearing the date of election. But in the case of the bargaining mentioned 
here, usually the decision (or the act of fulfilling a demand) may or may not be made 
within a short time. This would depend on the political strategy formulated by the 
Prime Minister as Chairman of the BN. For example, as explained in chapter six, the 
bargaining for a quota for non-Malay students by Lee San Choon, the MCA 
President, was decided on the spot by Hussein Onn. On the other hand, the demand 
for the amendment of the Education Act, 1996 made in 1985 was only fulfilled after 
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‘We have our conversion tables to avoid miscalculations. We need to 
look at the overall situation. This matter sometimes cannot be understood 
by the party making the demand because that party would usually not 
understand the actual political conversion table’. 
 
On the whole, it can be seen that bargaining is a norm and an avenue for the 
component parties or the NGOs to obtain what they want. This can be explained 
through the schedule below. 
 
 











1974 Demand for Posts Deputy Prime Minister Avoidance 
1978 A balance in the quota for university intakes Compromise  
1982 i. Re-delineation of electoral constituencies  





a. Authorised its minister to convert Chinese 
schools into national schools (Act 1961 
(21)) 
b. The Chinese and Tamil languages 
approved as mediums of instruction in 
schools 
c. The Integrated School concept was 
abolished 
 









1990 The quota system was abolished 
Demand for the Post of Senate Member 
Avoidance 
Compromise  
1995 The Smart School concept was abolished Compromise  
1999 Bargaining from the Suqiu Competition 
 
 
In managing demands from its component parties, the BN applies two main 
approaches, namely Compromise and Avoidance. What is clear here is that not all 
demands submitted will be fulfilled by the BN leadership, especially by the dominant 
party, UMNO. For demands that can be fulfilled, negotiations are carried out and a 
compromise is then achieved. These are such demands as explained in the above 
schedule. Demands that cannot be fulfilled are kept aside, but this did not mean the 
 
 
Southeast Asian Journal of Social and Political Issues - Vol 1, No. 1, March 2011 - 32
end of such demands, because these same demands are likely to be resubmitted in the 
future, as in the case of the demand for a Chinese Deputy Prime Minister. By 
carefully scrutinizing cases of demands from the component parties (particularly by 
the MCA, Gerakan and NGOs), it can be clearly concluded that any demand 
involving an attempt to reduce ‘Malay dominance’ would be rejected. Demands such 
as the review of the general election, as proposed by the MCA, was rejected because 
the allocation system proposed would reduce the number of seats held in majority by 
the Malays. Such was also the case with the demand for the post of Deputy Prime 
Minister and the abolition of the quota system. 
 
 
The approaches taken by the BN in managing conflict. 
 
In line with the objective to study the conflict management technique applied 
by the BN, this study therefore also concentrates on the approaches usually practised 
in managing these conflicts. As discussed in chapter eight, the BN is found to have 
used all five conflict management approaches that include Competition/Force, 
Collaboration, Avoidance, Accommodation and Compromise. Among these five 
approaches, the methods of Compromise, Accommodation and Avoidance are the 
most frequently used in handling the conflicts among party components. This 
argument is based on the study and findings regarding the conflict on seat allocation 
and the conflict on cabinet membership and portfolios. 
 
a. Conflict on seat allocation and its management 
 
Based on the conflicts discussed in chapter four, it can be generally concluded 
that in handling the conflict on seat allocation, the BN used two main approaches, 
namely Compromise and Accommodation. By using the approach of Compromise, 
every component party would negotiate or discuss to achieve an agreement on the 
allocation of seats. The process of Compromise was clearly used in the 1974, 1978, 
1986 and 1995 elections, in which there were demands from each component party 
for allocations of seats. These demands were made by UMNO, the MCA and 
Gerakan. 
 The second method applied is Accommodation, by which all component 
parties would jointly agree to uphold the cause of the BN first by putting aside the 
cause and objectives of their own parties. Each component party neither exerted any 
pressure nor demanded for any seats for itself. Throughout the history of the BN’s 
involvement in general elections, two factors gave rise to such a situation. The first 
took place in the 1982 general election, in which all the component parties cohesively 
agreed to ensure that the BN achieved a resounding victory as a mark of support to the 
new Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohammad who was appointed in 1981. The 
second happened in the 1990 and 1999 elections. In both these elections, the BN faced 
stiff competition when the opposition parties cooperated with one another to form a 
coalition to win as many seats as possible and also to end the dominant power by the 
Barisan Nasioanal. As a result, the component parties relaxed their demands regarding 
seat allocation and instead united to face the challenge from the opposition. Thus it 
was not surprising then that in the 1990 and 1999 general elections, the number of 
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seats allocated to the component parties did not differ from that in the previous 
election. The approaches of Compromise and Accommodation have clearly helped the 
BN settle the conflicts on seat allocation, which eventually provided a comfortable 
environment for contest in the general election. 
 
 











1974 Demand for allocation of existing seats Compromise  
1978 Demand for allocation of existing seats Compromise  
1982 Demand for allocation of existing seats Accommodation  
1986 Demand for allocation of new seats Compromise  
1990 Demand for allocation of existing seats Accommodation  
1995 Demand for allocation of new seats Compromise  




b. Cabinet conflicts and its management  
 
The conflicts that arose from the demands for cabinet posts revolved around 
two issues; firstly, to acquire more members in the Cabinet, and secondly, to hold 
portfolios categorised as key portfolios. These conflicts are managed through two 
approaches, namely Compromise and Avoidance (see Table 2).  For the posts of 
Minister, Compromise is widely used by Prime Ministers soon after he is elected. For 
instance Hussein Onn compromised on Cabinet membership upon his appointment as 
Prime Minister in 1976. Likewise with Dr. Mahathir, who took the same approach 
after being appointed in 1982. Following this initial stage, they had the tendency to 
maintain the Cabinet memberships and portfolios without change, as done by Dr. 
Mahathir, who rejected (Avoidance) demands made by the component parties in the 
1986, 1990, 1995 and 1999 elections. As for the post of Deputy Minister, there was a 
lot more compromise in terms of Cabinet portfolio or even Cabinet membership. In 
fact, based on the discussion in chapter five, there were actually changes in the post of 
Deputy Minister. 
This isn’t unexpected for a party with multiracial members, as Compromise 
and Avoidance are effective and good methods to ensure that each party is satisfied 
with the solution of every problem faced. On the other hand, the method of 
Competition, that leans towards the use of force through the implementation of certain 
Acts, such as the Internal Security Act (ISA), is seldom used although it is very 
effective in suppressing negative elements that may be detrimental to inter-party or 
interracial relations. What is clear is that the BN will use any of the five approaches 
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deemed the most appropriate to the nature of the conflict it is managing. Based on 
past experience, all these approaches have been very helpful in managing conflict 
within the BN. 
 
 
Table 3: Cabinet conflicts and its management 
 
Election Conflict Minister Deputy Minister 















































As mentioned repeatedly in early chapters, the Malaysian political scene was 
charted on the world map when Lijphart put Malaysia on a pedestal as an example of 
the consociationalism model in action. The Alliance Party established under the 
leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman with the coalition of UMNO, the MCA and the 
MIC placed political maturity under the patronage of the grand coalition that was its 
pride until the tragedy of 13 May 1969. 
In a way, this racial riot had collapsed the political superiority of the grand 
coalition. However, with a determination and ideas like none other, Abdul Razak 
Hussein, the second Prime Minister, rebuilt the union of power-sharing by 
establishing the BN. The formation of the BN had a somewhat positive impact in 
managing ethnic conflict in Malaysia. This is because according to Horowitz , ‘in an 
environment of ethnic conflict, there is room for only one multi-ethnic party or 
alliance (1985: 410). Basically, the BN provides a venue for racially-orientated 
political parties (UMNO, the MCA, Gerakan and the MIC) to collaborate and reside 
under one roof, which is acceptable by the plural society. The 1974 general election, 
won by the BN with 87.7 percent of the votes (the highest in Malaysian history), is an 
indirect proof of the acceptance of the concept of a grand coalition government, which 
is the most important of the consociation devices. 
Under the grand coalition government, there has been willingness among the 
various ethnic groups to co-operate on the difficult issues dividing the ethnic 
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communities, as evidenced in the management of conflict on the allocation and 
appointment of ministers/Exco members in this study. The ability to manage these 
conflicts also helped the BN maintain internal political stability among its 
components. With stability being maintained among the component parties, the BN is 
free to face the opposition parties. 
Lijphart, Gerhard Lembruch, Jurg Steiner, Val R. Lowin, Eric Nordlinger and 
S.F.R Noel had deliberated on the importance of stability, which is necessary in 
forming a coalition and a solid democratic system. A different terminology, such as 
accommodative, consociation, proportional or concordant, all of which stress the 
aspect of stability, is used as an important basis in a country with a plural society to 
ensure the smooth administration of its ethnic conflict. 
Donald Rothschild (1970:615) had recommended that concepts such as 
compromise, bargaining, balancing, reciprocity, and cooperation be practised in order 
to maintain stability and integrity in a plural society. These elements are being 
explicitly applied in the BN as one of the main approaches in managing the conflicts it 
faces. The allocation of electoral seats is done thoroughly with each community or 
party getting its just share. Likewise, the cabinet of the BN has always had 
representatives of the major ethnic groups. Proportionality operates in varying 
degrees. It operates roughly in the allocation of cabinet appointment and access to 
government decision-making bodies in general, in patronage posts and in the 
allocation of electoral seats among the component parties (Mauzy, 1983:137).  As a 
result of the chosen approach in managing conflict, the BN has managed to achieve 
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